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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELBERT B. RUMSEY, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent~ 
vs. \ Case No. 
)
' 10181 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Utah, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT, OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries to the 
respondent resulting from an accident on a diving board 
at the Wasatch Springs Plunge operated by the appel-
lant. 
DISPOSITION IN '"fHE LOWER COUR'"f 
A judgment was entered by the Third Judicial 
Court for Salt Lake County, Utah, upon a jury verdict 
3 
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on M~y 18, 1964, in favor of the respondent and.against 
the appellant. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGH'!, ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks to have the judgment reversed 
and the action dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This cause c~a~·~--~e-the lower court, sitting with 
a jury on the ays of May, 1964, upon 
the complaint of t e ondent upon the following 
facts: 
Salt Lake City Corporatiop owns and operates a 
municipal bathing resort, located at 840 North 2nd West 
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, known as the Wasatch 
Springs Plunge. 
That on the 26th day of June, 1963, the respondent 
entered the said plunge for the purpose of sw~ng 
therein. Mr. Elbert'B~ Rumsey, the respondent, was at 
that time fifty-three years of age. (R. 163, lines 25 and 
26.) While attempting to dive from the low diving board 
in the north end of the swimming pool or plunge, he 
injured his knee, ( R. 1 ~4) severing the patellar liga-
ment. (R. 189 and R. 190.) After the accident the 
respondent was taken from the Wasatch Springs 
Plunge across the street to the St. Mark's Hospital 
4 
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(R. 165, lines 20 and 21) where Dr. Robert D. Morrow 
(R. 137) operated on him, sewing the severed tendon 
together. (R. 189 and R. 190.) 
Mr. Rumsey was aV',ray from work because of the 
injury for about two and one-half months (R. 170, 
line 5) and lost one-half day's "\-vork for another month. 
(R. 170, lines 8 and 9.) 
The appellant claims that his injuries were due to 
an exposed part of the aluminum diving board which 
had worn bare on the end thereof of the safety walk. 
Ross Ferrin, lifeguard at the Wasatch Springs Plunge, 
testified that this worn part exposed only a part of the 
end of the diving board. (R. 103, R. Ill, and exhibit 
D-6). When the safety matting or safety walk was 
replaced on the end of the diving board it covered much 
more than the exposed area alleged to have been the 
cause of the accident. (R. 121). 
1\'Ir. Rumsey worked for Western Garden Center, 
as a stockman (R. 181, lines 5 and 6) and earned ap-
proximately $37 5.00 per month. ( R. 170, line 2.) 
On July 17, 1963, Mr. Rumsey claims to have 
suffered a heart attack (R. 167, lines I and 2) and taken 
to L.D.S. Hospital. (R. 167.) 
After the verdict of the jury was made and entered 
on May 5, 1964 (R. 63) the appellant moved for a judg-
ment in its favor, notwithstanding the verdict, (R. 65, 
66 and 67) and filed notice for hearing thereof within 
5 
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ten ( 10) days after entry of Judgment, to-wit, on May 
21, 1964, (R. 74, 75 and 76) which motion was denied 
by the court on the 3rd day of June, 1964. (R. 79 and 
R. 80.) 
On May 25, 1964, the respondent filed a motion to 
clarify or amend the judgment or grant a new trial on 
the issue of governmental immunity. (R. 71.) This was 
one week after the entry of the judgment on the jury 
verdict, ( R. 68) and ten ( 10) days after the verdict of 
the jury had been rendered and entered and the jury 
discharged. ( R. 63.) 
The motion of the respondent was granted by the 
court on the 3rd day of June, 1964, (R. 79 and R. 80) 
and hearing thereon was heard by the court alone on 
June_ 15, 1964, at which time the case was reopened and 
new and further testimony given in the absence of the 
jury over the objections of the appellant. (R. 191, R. 
195, lines 1 to 12 inclusive. See proceedings of June 15, 
1964.) (R. 191 to R. 209, inclusive.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE RESPONDENT DID NOT ALLEGE 
OR PLEAD ANY FACTS SHOWING THAT 
THE APPELLANT OPERATED THE WA-
SATCH SPRINGS PLUNGE IN A PROPRIE-
TARY CAPACITY. 
6 
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Before the respondent can recover from the appel-
lant city, not only must it plead facts overcoming the 
operation of the Wasatch Springs Plung~ as a govern-
mental function, but must affirmatively plead that the 
appellant city was operating the Wasatch Springs 
Plunge in a proprietary capacity. r~rhis, the respondent 
did not do. (R. I and R. 2.) 
In Wade vs. Salt Lake City, 10 Utah 2d 374, 353 
Pacific 2d 914, on page 915 of the Pac. Rep., this court 
said: 
"Nothing is alleged reflecting any other use 
than that suggested, and we take it that any 
purpose other than governmental must be plead-
ed and be free fro~m legislative inhibition:'~ (Em-
phasis added. ) 
"Action against a city by a county employee, 
injured by lawn mower operated by a city em-
ployee while they were mowing city park. Law 
appeal from judgment of common pleas court, 
which sustained demurrer by city. The court of 
appeals held plaintiff did not state a good cause 
of action when sufficient facts were not alleged 
to charge city was acting in a proprietary capac-
ity.n (Emphasis added.) Ballanger vs. City of 
Dayton, 1952, 117 N.E.2d 469. 
Cities are organized as political subdivisions of the 
state to exercise governmental functions locally within 
their boundaries, and not for business purposes, the pre-
sumption being, unless pleaded .and proved to the con-
trary, that any activity undertaken by them is govern-
r.aental and for the good of all of their inhabitants. Davis 
vs. Provo City, 1 Utah 2d 244, 265 P.2d 415. 
7 
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"The rule is general that a municipal corpora-
tion is not liable for alleged tortious injuries to 
the persons or property of individuals, when 
engaged in the perfomance of public or govern-
mental functions or duties. So far as municipal 
corporations exercise powers conferred on them 
for purposes essentially public, they stand as does 
the sovereignty "vhose agents they are, and are 
not liable to be sued for any act or omission oc-
curring while in the exercise of such powers, un-
less by some statute the right of action be given." 
Gillmor vs. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 180, 89 P. 
714, where this court cited with approval the 
above quotation from American and English 
Encyclopedia of Law, page 1193. 
The motion of the appellant for a dismissal of the 
respondent's cause of action should have been granted 
by the lower court and judgment for the appellant made 
and entered notwithstanding the verdict. (R. 65 and 
R. 67.) 
POINT II. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE, AND THE 
RESPONDENT DID NOT PROVE THAT 
THE PARTIALLY EXPOSED END OF THE 
DIVING BOARD "WAS THE PROXIlVIATE 
CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES. 
One may search the record from beginning to end 
in this case and will never discover any positive or sub-
stantial evidence connecting the accident and the result-
ing injuries of the respondent with the partially exposed 
end of the diving board, as the cause of the accident and 
8 
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the appellant's injuries. (See respondent's own testi-
mony. R. 164 and R. 165; R. 180 through R. 182; R. 
183, line 1 through 12). No witness testified that he sa"v 
the accident,and it is obvious from the respondent's own 
testimony that he does not know what caused him to fall 
except a self-serving conclusion. The exposed part of 
the diving board was very small and so trivial as not 
to cause an accident. (R. 103, lines 1 through 17.) (See 
Exhibit D 6.) While the repaired area was twenty ( 20) 
inches crosswise and fourteen ( 14) inches lengthwise, 
the exposed metal area at the time of the accident meas-
ured only twelve ( 12) to fourteen ( 14) inches crosswise 
and only three ( 3) to four ( 4) inches lengthwise of the 
end of the diving board. ( R. 101, lines 27 through 30; 
R. 103, lines 3 through 10.) 
"An operator of a diving pool to which the 
public is admitted on payment of admission is not 
an insurer of the safety of the patrons but must 
use reasonable care and diligence in furnishing 
and 1naintaining the premises in a reasonably 
safe condition for the purpose for which it is 
designed and to which it is adapted, but is not 
chargeable with negligence for failure to foresee 
a possible injury rather than a probable one.n 
Webb vs. Thomas, 133 Colo. 458, 296 P.2d 1036. 
"Even if defendant in the construction and 
operating of a swimming pool where patron was 
injured when he dived into the pool, there was 
no liability for the patron's injuries unless the 
alleged negligence of the proprietor was the 
proximate cause thereof." Webb vs. Thomas 
' 133 Colo. 458, 296 P.2d 1036. 
9 
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In Suarello vs. Coast Holding Co.,. (1934)., 242 
App. Div. 802, 274 N.Y.S. 776, the owner of a swim-
ming pool was held not liable for injuries received by a 
patron who slipped and fell on a wet floor, the court 
saying: 
"The slippery condition of the platform sur-
rounding the defendant's swimming pool was 
necessarily incidental to the use of the bath. There 
was no proof of the violation of any duty or obli-
gation on the part of the defendant to provide 
a covering for the floor at the point where the 
plaintiff fell.'' 
"A municipality is not liable for a defect in its 
premises unless the defect constitutes an unsafe 
condition but is also of a substantial nature.~~ 
White vs. Standard Oil Company, Ohio App. 
1962, 187 N.E.2d 504. 
"Plaintiff's allegation of a defect in the pool, 
without proof thereof creates. no liability, for 
negligence is never presumed." Home Market 
vs. N ewrock, Ill Colo. 428, 142 P.2d 272. 
"The ·mere happening of the accident does not 
raise a presumption of negligence." National Co. 
vs. Holt, 137 Colo. 208, 322 P .2d 1046 ( 1958). 
City of Au.rora vs. JoAnn L. Weeks, June 24, 
1963, 384 P.2d 90. 
"Fact that a large number of patrons had used 
water slide located at the edge of swimming pool 
in amusement park without mishap was evidence, 
in action by patron against owner and operator 
of park to recover for injuries sustained on water 
slide, that water slide \vas not inherently danger-
ous." Hays vs. Glen Echo Park Co., 215 Fed. 
2d 34. 
10 
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"In an action for injuries sustained by patron 
when he dived into a swimming pool operated by 
defendant, where patron dived in at the shallow 
end where there was no diving board, evidence 
that the pool had been used by many thousands 
of persons without accident and that the water 
where plaintiff's injuries occurred was three and 
one-half feet deep established that the defendant 
was not negligent in the maintenance of the 
pool." Webb vs. Thomas, 133 Colo. 458, 296 P. 
2d 1036. 
"A person entering a public bathhouse oper-
ated by the state, owed a duty to the state while 
on its premises to use ordinary care to a void 
injury." Grifel vs. State, 110 N.Y.S.2d 739. 
POINT Ill. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN REOPENING THE CASE 
TO TAKE ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY 
AFTER THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS 
RENDERED AND ENTERED AND JUDG-
MENT ENTERED, THE JURY DIS-
CHARGED AND THE RESPONDENT HAD 
RESTED HIS CASE. 
It is the opinion of counsel for the appellant that 
counsel for the respondent never thought of producing 
further testimony in this action until he was served with 
a notice and motion of said appellant to grant it a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury. ,-fhe ap-
pellant filed and served by mail on counsel for the re-
spondent, such motion on the 21st day of May, 1964. 
11 
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Thereafter on the 25th day of May, 1964, the respondent 
filed a "motion to clarify or amend the judgment or 
grant a new trial on the issue of governmental im-
munity." Counsel for the respondent alleges that he was 
taken by surprise and that there was an agreement or 
stipulation between counsel or that counsel for appellant 
admitted that the respondent had alleged a good cause 
of action. Counsel for the appellant emphatically denies 
any such stipulation, agreement or admission. 
Only some the of defenses set forth in the appel-
lant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
were mentioned in the pretrial conference or incorpo-
rated in the pretrial order. The court made the order 
and the appellant admits it is bound thereby, but noth-
ing appears anywhere in the record to verify the con-
tention of counsel for the respondent that counsel for 
appellant made any agreements, stipulations or admis-
sions outside those contentions incorporated in the pre-
trial order regarding the capacity in which the appel-
lant operated the Wasatch Springs Plunge. There is 
nothing in the motion of the respondent by way of sur-
prise that counsel could not have guarded against 
and prepared. His pleadings were defective in not 
alleging the capacity in which Salt Lake City operat-
ed its municipal bath, anrl it was. nre.Judicial error 
· reSHOnaent s 
for the court to, under the~ motion, to reopen 
the jury trial, after verdict and judgment had been 
rendered, and the respondent's case rested, to the detri-
ment, prejudice and injury of the appellant's substan-
tial rights. 
12 
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Rule 59 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
pertinent part here, provides as follows: 
"(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of 
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any 
of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for 
any of the following causes; provided, however, 
that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a. jury~ the court may open the judgment 
if one has been entered, take additional testi-
mony, amend findings of fact and conclusions 
of law or make new findings and conclusions, 
and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
"***" 
Rule 59 (a) was not designed to reopen a case tried 
by a jury after its verdict has been rendered and judg-
ment thereon entered, but under its provisions, it is 
respectfully submitted that such may be done only where 
the case is tried to the court without a jury and one or 
more of the grounds set forth in the rule alleged. 
The only cases in Utah for reopening a case that 
counsel has found appurtenant to the question at hand 
are the following and all have been tried without a jury: 
In an action to quiet title to certain real estate by 
adverse possession, tried to the court only, the Supreme 
Court held: 
"The refusal of the trial court to grant a mo-
tion of the plaintiff to reopen to present addi-
tional evidence, after he had rendered his deci-
sion~ was well within his discretion." Bowen et 
al. vs. Olson et al., 2 U.2d 12, 268 P.2d 983 at 
page 986 of the Pacific Reporter. 
13 
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Plaintiff brought suit in District Court for Davis 
County, Utah, for the purpose of enjoining the main-
tenance and operations of an oil refining plant on the 
theory that it was a nuisance, .. Supreme Court held: 
"Case may be reopened after trial is closed, 
formal decision announced and findings of fact 
proposed." VV asatch Oil Refining Co. vs. 'lV ade 
( 1936) ,. 63 p .2d 1070. 
Footnote cases in ·which court cites for same prin-
cipal are: Kinsman vs. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 53 U. 10, 
177 P. 418, suit for injunction. Summers vs. Provo 
Foundary and Machinery Co., 53 U. 320, 178 P. 916, 
suit to recind a contract (equity) . Barboglio et al. vs. 
Gibson et al. (1923), 61 Utah 314, 213 P. 385, suit for 
injunction. 
Needham vs. First National Bank of Salt Lake 
City, 96 U. 432, 85 P.2d 785. This was a suit on a note 
tried to the court without a jury. Case was not reopened. 
Kirkham vs. Spencer, 3 U.2d 399, 285 P.2d 127. 
This was an action for unlawful detainer tried by court. 
Court properly reopened case on its own motion under 
Rule 59 (d). 
Tuft vs. Brotherson, 106 U. 499, 150 P.2d 384. 
This case was an action tried without a jury for breach 
of sales contract. Motion to reopen case denied. 
14 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted by virtue of the fore-
going authorities, that the judgment of the lower court 
should be reversed and the action against the appellant 
disn1issed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOMER HOLMGREN 
City Attorney 
A. M. MARSDEN 
Assistant City Attorney 
414 City and County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
15 
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